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IGBO THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE: THEORETICAL AND 
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS. 
Albert O. M. Ogoko 
Abstract 
Ontological truth held by traditions in the history of human 
knowledge is that man irresistibly, desires to know. The Igbo is not 
precluded from treading this rational part. Contrarily, Eurocentric’s 
as a mythology enunciates an I-other/we-they epistemic divide, 
serving an ideological project. White is rational black is not. This 
ideological space differentiation sought to foundation every other 
construct, in economics and politics, in the socio-culture and 
religion, and even in epistemology. It is argued that philosophical 
enterprise arises out of individual rational activities. Whatever is 
thought and discussed of any reality and sphere of human activity 
stems out of a particular epistemic matrix and paradigms, mental or 
ideological coloration of a people. It is not the case that every 
thought or rational enquiry amounts to a philosophy. Similarly 
cultural practices cannot be exhumed as philosophy. But given this 
moulding, the problems of relativism and commensurability not 
withstanding, we can talk of Igbo theory of knowledge as reflecting 
a perspective of this universal enterprise.  
 
Introduction 
Basic in the rationality debate about the existence of African 
philosophy, I will say, is an epistemological problem. Henry Oruka, 
in Four Trends in Current African Philosophy may have condemned 
African philosophy because this referent derives from a “body of 
thoughts and belief” produced by an “unique way of thinking.” He is 
cautious in accepting the possibility of an erected African 
philosophy because its claim to an unique conceptual scheme 
radically divorces from the logical format of Western tradition: “It is 
assumed that there is a way of thinking or a conceptual frame work 
that is uniquely African and which is at the same time radically in 
European.” ( D. Alwin, ed.,1) Besides, he thinks (or did think) that 
proffering an answer to the question what is African philosophy may 
be too early or perhaps the question is a nonsensical verbiage like 
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what is African death? ( Sodipo, ed., 133). Now, beyond a decade, 
Professor Odera Oruka and others who shared this opinion must 
have shifted position. However, their reasons are not far fetched. 
African philosophical discourse is almost totally apologetic and for 
the greater part is determined by the nature of debates/arguments 
directed against the discipline. In most of our institutions, 
programmes of studies are not yet structured to reflect the true nature 
and need for an African philosophy. At best in most cases what is 
tenable is just introductory course work for a semester or two. In 
these instances there is the dearth of academic hands and near 
absence of textbooks on which to ground tutorials. It was against this 
background that Oruka H. Odera premised his argument, 
To the extent that European philosophy is known to 
manifest critical and rigorous analysis, and logical 
explanations and synthesis, African philosophy is 
considered to be innocent of such characteristics. It is 
considered to be basically intuitive, mythical and 
counter or extra rationalistic (in, Diemer Alwin, 1) 
 
Granted, philosophy is a universal human activity. Given also 
the difference of and relativity of our environment and cultural 
practices are we justified to ground our evaluation of Igbo (African) 
experience on European formula? It might be argued that knowledge 
is knowledge everywhere as metaphysics is metaphysics, and 
mathematics is. The same principle or law might be in application. 
But the manner of applying and explaining that reality, say a 
theorization might vary. The implication of the claims of Odera 
Oruka and his likes is that it takes up and amplifies Eurocentric 
discourse against the rationality of African people. This discourse is 
strongly countered by V.U. Mudimbe’s The Invention of Africa, The 
Idea of Africa; D. Masolo’s African philosophy in Search of an 
Identity; Cheik Anta Diop’s African Origin of Greek Civilization; 
T.U. Nwala, S. Oladipo, N. Otakpor among others. 
The Igbo seeks to know and to understand, to explain and to 
describe his /her experiences and grasps of realities. Such sifts are 
articulated as our world-view. From it a body of knowledge is 
constructed. It encapsulates the principles conditioning his response-
criteria. He or she must also explain an understanding of the 
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exigencies of nature and articulate rationale as justification for a 
proffered theory. This theory has been battered in the mould of 
Western interpretations. Given the disjuncture of our historical 
experience, the reality of our ontological experiences is to be 
interpreted within that of the rich phenomenological gamut of 
cultural environment. 
The obvious problematic here is not the possibility of the noetic 
experience. Rather it bothers now on nomenclature, whether or not 
one should be talking about Igbo theory/conception of knowledge, or 
simply Igbo epistemological/ metaphysical notions, etc. We have 
Chinese philosophy, Indian philosophy (Oriental), Western 
philosophy (Continental rationalism and Empiricism), German 
Idealism, Arab philosophy, etc on continental, regional and other 
levels. Each of these shares unique factors characteristic of a 
particular, political, social, economic culture, a given historical 
experience, social discourse and knowledge matrix. Each of these 
traditions evolved theories tending towards a common ontological 
truth of all reality. Various theories are made and on the basis of 
factual life experience these are re-evaluated and modified. We 
judge these various theories as commensurable, verisimilar, etc 
because each arrives at the same truth about reality from different 
vantage points. 
 
Philosophy as Worldview 
Philosophy is the search for ultimate reality. Philosophy is a 
universal activity and is strictly one if it is rational and critical, 
logical and systematic, non-suppositional, reflective, evaluative and 
synthetic, etc in method. Though universal philosophy is the 
domestication of a world-view. Every philosophizing arises out of a 
particular cultural mould, attitudinal climate, value system, 
epistemological matrix and conceptual scheme, ontological 
categorization, and so forth. Cultural practice is universal in so far as 
there are common categories around which every people and race 
conceive their thought, analyze, criticize and synthesize their views 
and perception of realities. Culture then reflects such traditions as 
the principles and justification of knowledge on the basis of the 
uniqueness of their historical and ontological experience. For 
instance there is the Newtonian synthesis of enlightenment and 
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industrial revolution. On this cultural tradition, philosophy veered 
dangerously into mechanism. Examples are the philosophies of 
Baruch Spinoza, Leibniz, Rene Descartes, and Immanuel Kant 
among others. Again think of the way the social conditions created 
by political upheaval in consequence of the Enlightenment and 
industrial revolution in France and Britain inspired the (political) 
philosophies of John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, Jean Jacques 
Rousseau among others, and Machiavellian by the need for the 
Italian Prince consolidating and wielding absolute power; and the 




Peter du Preezin A Science of Mind, The quest for psychological 
Reality thinks that to understand a theory in terms of a knowledge 
matrix one ought to concern himself/herself with questions about the 
Social and intellectual contexts and content of theories. In the first 
place theories perform social functions and are socially conditioned. 
These functions are determined by social structures. The social 
matrix reflects the psychological attitudes, and habits of the people, 
their ideological make up, rhetoric and manoeuvres and intellectual 
discourses (4). If theories are socially conditioned how do we escape 
from relativism and determine the verity of our theory? We (i) 
“admit that different theories arise in different cultures and social 
structures” and (ii) still claim that these can be compared and 
evaluated. (6) But we encounter epistemic and judgmental relativism 
respectively. 
A semiotic approach to culture, takes every culture to consist of 
as a system of signs. Hence it is information carrier. We do not see 
culture. But at each stage we can always point at some concrete 
material reality, which informs us of the thing in question about this 
culture. It is a kind of a phenomenology, and this always embodies a 
rationale, serving the pedagogical and elitist functions. The various 
elements of culture-language, marriage, custom, tradition, folklore, 
myths, festivals, arts and poetry, etc employ various materials in 
their actual practice. Some of these include clothing of different 
colours, food items—yam, cassava, and palm wine; specific objects, 
and animals: kola-nuts, chalk clay, egg, hides and skins, palm fronts, 
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masks, implements of work, weapons of war and symbols of peace, 
specific kinds of trees’ bark, roots or leaves, buildings, etc serve 
practical purposes, act as monuments and perform textual functions 
(12). How do the details of the text hang together into an episteme? 
The life of man (in the generic) with others of his kind in every 
moment of his existentiality is a dialectical one. He enters into a 
kind of dialectic with nature and with material things, which are 
purposeful creation of his rationality, his artifice and ontological 
quest, the basis of his sustenance and strivings. Every day, fresh 
questions are raised; the old answers are once more taken up and re-
examined about this world, wicked or beautiful, Uwa nkea ruru aru, 
nke juputara na nsogbu, uwa oma, etc, about the nature of man, 
madu (Nma di) as repository of God’s goodness, his follies, and 
wisdom, mode of perception, intellection, validation of truth, about 
politics, economics, history etc.. 
The primary objects of Igbo knowledge are God, Spirits, 
ancestors and material substances. God is an eternal rationality, 
infinite immaterial substance, and supreme in essence. He is all-
powerful, hence being called the most Supreme Being, Chi- ukwu 
and consequently the creator and sustainer of all life, God is the only 
Being that creates ex nihilo, He is Chi n’eke. God is the first and 
final cause of all things. By a causal necessity all things 
determinately follow and are ordained. Freedom is complying with 
this determinism. Whatever was, is and will be is already ordered to 
be so…. Whatever we are, can attain or achieve must derive from 
God. We are efficient causal agents with distinctive destiny parcels. 
Since God is Supremely removed or distanced from mortal men, we 
reach him through other media ….Man also enters into dialectics 
with forces in nature. The world is saturated with the power of God. 
Man learns to harness it….Life is cyclic and nothing is unconnected. 
Every thing is related; one thing flowing into the other. The 
mechanistic dualism of the mind-body interaction postulated by 
Rene Descartes and others do not apply in Igbo metaphysical space.  
At all times we discover we make appeal to the veracity of the 
senses, or the evidence of authority or the ontological finality of the 
intellect as the capacity for being, capax entis. Whatever he or she 
senses he or she thinks. Whatever he or she thinks in the abstract he 
or she tries to substantiate into the concrete. Trends in empiricism, 
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idealism, pragmatism, materialism and rationalism can be 
delineated, though not easily due to what I consider a unique 
mathematical and logical operation. The rhythm in nature, the flow 
and interaction of beings reveal the principles by which beings are in 
dialectic. Ontologically, there are dialectical principles in things. The 
principles seek to explain the nature of individual things. It also 
explains how it relates to, how it is in harmony and or in conflict and 
the dialectical process involved. It is this reality that reason seeks to 
raise up as science. Science refers to the articulated body of 
knowledge resultant of the practice (noun), then as verb the manner 
of the procedure or method. 
The Igbo is as empirical as he is rational. He employs his 
organs of sight, sound, taste, touch, and perceiving in interacting 
with his environment. To effectively explore and harness its 
promises and riches and to control its excesses the man strives to 
understand what he is dealing with. For Newton-Smith the scientific 
enterprise is made intelligible on the assumptions of realism. 
Realism is incompatible with the indeterminacy of translations as 
Quine would want us accept. To subscribe to indeterminacy 
Newton-Smith argues, implies that we cannot even make categorical 
statements about nature, reality and the world. If there is nothing to 
be said and expressed in words and in language then nothing can be 
claimed as true or otherwise falsified. The realist pictures the world 
as being more or les determinate and takes it to be possible to frame 
assertions, which express the state of the world. This is only possible 
if sentences have more or less determinate sense (181).  
Thus, the scientific method has been described as a 
modification of common-sense realism. Correlations do exist 
between observable phenomena. Pre-scientific common-sense 
procedure entails the discovery of such correlations. The observed 
correlations bring about controlled circumstances in which to test 
conjecture. Repeated conjunctions of observable refine into the 
scientific method. From tests and hypothesis it finally evolves into 
inductively supported metaphysical principles and axioms. The Igbo 
world-view is rich in this. Within our social community, new angles, 
suggestions, options, and methods are tried and conceptual schemes 
and mode of categorization are improved. As regards judgmental 
relativism in connection with the comparability of different theories 
Albert Ogoko                                                                                19 
 
Preez asserts that it does not state that it is always possible, or that 
any theory can be compared with any other, but merely that in 
certain significant instances we can judge one theory to be better 
than another. Where we are not able to do this it is because theories 
are indistinguishably bad or because they totally work in different 
domains as a theory of magnetism and a theory of angels must (7). 
Cultures vary one from another that it is not always possible to 
compare them.  
 
The Question of Method 
He who desires an end must have a means to achieve it. 
Descartes in the Discourse on Method explains that method 
“consists entirely in the order and disposition of the objects towards 
which our mental vision must be directed.”(xv) For Angeles, it is 
“the Systematic means which a philosopher uses to attain truth, or 
the procedure by which knowledge is obtained.” (76) The question 
of method in Igbo theory of knowledge depends upon the material 
object of Igbo epistemology. In other words what forms the 
“content” so to speak of notice experience. These content materials 
are to be found enshrined and encapsulated in the material and 
immaterial aspects of our culture. This explains Igbo realities in an 
ocean world of realities. Rationality is brought to bear in articulating 
realities. And if a people also have a language, then there is a way of 
conceptualizing their experiences of reality. Given the non-
availability of texts in this area, we need to rely on the retrievability 
of the oral as preserved and encased in proverbs, idiomatic and 
figurative expressions (immaterial aspect of culture), as well as the 
visible material aspects of the practice, hence orality on text. There 
are certain statements that are monumentalized as traditions, as the 
words of our elders, which are always there and are open for the 
ever-ongoing dialectic, and discourses of our environment.  
Such areas, though witnessing certain redefinitions are textual. 
In this vein, examination of language as a system of signs and 
symbols is important. A sign points to a thing or reality. Symbol 
stands for or takes the place of another thing. The words we employ 
in spoken and written communication express meanings and so point 
to a reality and stands for something else (Adler, ed., 730). Words as 
signs and symbols get the meanings they express from our ideas, 
20                                                                Igbo Theory of Knowledge 
 
thoughts, feelings and emotions, desires, etc. It is about our everyday 
interactions; politics, economics, morals, ideology, etc in the market 
place, in schools, and other social gathering. Such social 
engagements entail discourses, dialectics and transfer of meanings or 
displacement. The relation between metaphor, metonymy and myth 
is explained as set of cognitive manoeuvres for understanding the 
similarities, associations and essences of our social environment. We 
think metaphorically when we associate perceived similarities 
between things. We “look at one thing as though it were another, 
while remaining aware that it is not.  
When we cease to be aware of a distinction, similarity becomes 
identity.”( Preez, 79). Metonymy is a change of name. In Igbo agu 
(lion) is a name implying bravery. In this discourse we describe a 
thing by “some accompaniment or significant adjunct, instead of 
naming the thing itself.” Okada as commercial motorcyclists imply 
swiftness. (80) .We search for new combinations, contiguities and 
associations in things. To think mythically is to attempt to “reduce 
the distance between discourse and reality.” We create sacred 
language or discover a world of real or proper names. (80,81) 
Certain expressions in Igbo such as okpokoro isi, isi 
aturu(sheep),that is, empty or block head, tabula  rasa; isi igho nko, 
as in egg head or intelligence; are epistemic.  
Attempt at establishing an Igbo theory of knowledge must be 
dialectical of our socio-cultural environment. Human reason seeks 
the ultimate principles by which to make beings explainable. 
Already capacitated as rational, the Igbo man possesses innate ideas 
and intuits metaphysical principles serving as axioms. Some of these 
are ihe mere ede ji bee nwii (causality), ihe kwuru, ihe akwudebe ya, 
“relation or proportionality; ezuo ka aha eri udele, a totue ngiga, 
identity or community. The method takes the form of 
phenomenology. Phenomenology comes from the Greek phainesthai 
“to appear” and logos “science of. Angeles defines it as the scientific 
study of the essences, a science in which we come to know the mind 
as it is in itself, through the study of the ways in which it appears to 
us (210f). It is the “scientific description of consciousness and its 
intentional objects in their pun essences, suspending assertions for 
their existence, independent of consciousness” (Kelleerman, 712). 
As was first introduced by Johaun H. Lambert, in his neues organon 
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phenomenon was taken to mean “the illusory features of human 
experiences; the study became, for him the “theory of illusions.” 
However the problem theory of knowledge bears squarely on the 
validity criterion, “given the illusory and imperfect nature of our 
sense organs and intellect. The task of validating knowledge starts 
by “striping away all previously acquired opinions, assumptions and 
prejudices not only of our everyday experience but also these 
interfered with our knowledge of the past. A lot of things have been 
written about African’s past, his illogicality, irrationality, lack of 
philosophy and hence on absence of epistemology. Certain Igbo 
concepts, terms and cultural expressions cannot be adequately 
translated into the English language. Given the intranslatability in 
languages due to different conceptual schemes, Kwesi Wiredu called 
for deconstruction of such permissive philosophical concepts as 
cause, effect, such and immortality, freedom and determinism, 
substance, accidents, being, God, Spirits, Angels, vitalism, essence, 
potency, act. 
The method of explanation in the natural sciences is mainly the 
hypothesis Deductive model. The model is “a form of logical 
arrangement of knowledge” in the natural sciences and encapsulates 
a “concrete concept of the deductive or axiomatic theory.” It 
“applies to the specific nature of the natural science in question. 
Based on experiment and observation the theory presupposes the 
possibility of empirical verification of its propositions (Frolov, 181). 
The method gives rise to the experimental/analytic, the deductive or 
synthetic a priori methods; the third, the analytico-synthetic method 
is a combination of the first two. (Ryan, 16-18). The 
experimental/Analytic method consists in problem identification, 
observations, accumulation and verification of facts. For the 
experimentalists fact alone is of value. But sine these in themselves 
have neither cognitive value nor are they of necessity bound together 
by any principle or law possessing objective validity, the 
philosopher must seek the relation in realities. This is what 
Descartes calls the common, uniform or universal nature in all 
things. Philosophy is the science, which considers “first and 
universal or general causes”. Thus a veritable method disregards the 
immediate causes, which the practical sciences concern themselves 
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and concentrate on the ultimate reasons as underlying factors in the 
relations of things.  
By analysis and synthesis of concepts, the Igbo epistemologist 
“extracts the inner core” of all realities presented to him from 
without, realities about the diversity in nature and as penetrated by 
the observer cum philosopher. Analysis is the breaking down of 
concepts from the complex to their simpler components. Igbo 
epistemology achieves this by nkowa (analysis/explanation), as in 
kowa ya k’odo m anya; make it clear for me to understand; by 
debates, arguments and discussion (Iru uka), by asking question and 
answering them (ajujuu na osisa) etc .We infer and deduce in 
accordance to the principles of formal logic and mathematics so as to 
disclose the order and relationship in a subject matter. To be relevant 
such analysis will entail cross-cultural or trans-cultural comparisons 
and evaluation. An Igbo epistemological explanation will derive 
from Igbo conceptual framework. This expresses the level of 
rationality, discursive climate and characteristic internal consistency 
of the Igbo logic of perception of reality which the whole socio-
cultural environment ontologically imports. Conceptual schemes 
differ from culture to culture; the truth as described and explained by 
one culture’s conceptual scheme can never be adequately expressed 
by another. This relativism does not preclude attainment of objective 
truth as to imply that no truth cuts across conceptual frameworks. 
Contrarily, it does and this can be compared to determine its 
consistency with other theories. 
Hermeneutic derives from the Greek hermenukos, of or for 
interpretation in the sense of enunciation. Referring to the Greek 
God Hermes hermeneutics implies “a messenger who came from the 
divine and hence brings the message of faith,” of truth, consistency, 
regarding the ontological nature of things in the face of possible 
misinterpretation and bastardization by men in the course of their 
daily life. (Mchean ed., 8). This reference is suggestive of something 
of the exalted character of the meaning which is sought for in 
interpretation, in our case, the Igbo cultural values and its 
implication for the Igbo worldview. The message borne by Hermes 
is the “limitless wisdom regarding the source and hence the reality, 
and the value of all.”(8) There is an ontological relationship and 
interplay between nature and man’s consciousness. The values 
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perceived of culture and traditions are the roots and sources of every 
form of knowledge of reality. On these the mind works upon and 
seeks to discover the unchanging and permanent guides for human 
action (even in a changing universe) and the “continuing structures 
of complex entities and the table laws of changes” (8). Therefore, 
hermeneutic, (as deconstructive reconstruction) is concerned, with a 
“vision of what is most real in itself and most lasting through time.”  
Aristotle was right when he indicated the concern for values in 
describing the philosophical quest, the science of wisdom as 
“knowing to what ends each thing must be done…. this end is the 
good of that thing, and in general the supreme good in the whole of 
nature.” (Metaphysics, 3, 2, 199 
b 
, 14-17). Such a science is most 
divine for God is the first cause and principle of all things. It will 
entail the promethean to unveil it. Thus Igbo people assert causal 
realism in Ife si na Chi, meaning that light, knowledge, wisdom, 
reality, or insight comes from God who has dubbed all things with 
his divine touch. 
Human history seeks the circumstances in which one perceives 
the values presented in the tradition and mobilizes one’s own project 
towards the future. Our true historical situation is understood in all 
truth when divested of perceptual and interpretational illusions and 
myopia. According to Kuhn much of what most of us accept as 
contemporary scientific beliefs and techniques stem from images of 
popular scientific accounts which are got from standard textbooks. 
However, what we learn of the history of science, according to W.H, 
Newton-Smith is “thoroughly cleaned-up versions of past scientific 
triumphs. We learn nothing of the failures. We glean nothing about 
the state of science during its barren period. And our grasp of the 
struggle that preceded the great moments of science derives more 
often than not from what the makers of these moments themselves 
said about the struggle (102). An indigenous science and technology, 
and theory of knowledge can only germinate from our true cultural 
history. There are shared symbolic generalizations. This implies 
contextually, the basic theoretical assumptions held in common by 
the Igbo pro-scientific community. Such assumptions on major 
categories of our conceptions have not been properly interpreted or 
are misinterpreted. Method is a disposition according to Asouzu 
(141). Culture predisposes, equips and capacitates for every ability. 
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Every philosopher attends to problems that are current in his time. 
These may not be entirely new problems in the course of human 
history. The newness which such problem and solution tends to have 
is because a definite context is involved. This particularity envisages 
and calls for new angle or approach to the same old problem and 
solution; it gives a new perspective, a new interpretation, the setting 
of a new language, cherished values, possible reformulation (141). 
Values are the basis for doing whatever we do, and holding to 
what we hold and defend. The values perceived by a scientific 
community guide and determine their agreement. Values are partly 
learned by the community members and they evolve with it. Values 
are regarded as “good-making qualities of theories and that this 
agreement is important in determining the particular theory choice 
by the scientific community” (Newton-Smith, 105). Among these 
values are accuracy, consistency, broad scope, simplicity and 
fruitfulness. Kuhn in Newton-Smith explains these five: 
(i)A theory is accurate in its domain when the deduced 
consequences are in “demonstrated agreement with the results of 
existing experiments and observations”;(ii) Such a theory should be 
consistent not only within, itself but also with other “currently 
accepted theories applicable to related aspects of nature”. (112); (iii) 
Being broad in scope means that the theories “consequences should 
extend beyond the particular observation, laws, or sub-theories it 
was initially designed to explain” (113); (iv) The simplicity brings 
order to phenomena that in its absence would be individually 
confused”, and (v) A theory is fruitful if it yields new findings or 
discloses new phenomena or a previously un-noted relationships 
existing among the already known facts.  
 
Suggestions 
(i) Restructuring Academic curricula. Some decades now after 
the Great Debate the departments of philosophy in many of our 
academic institutions are yet to be properly organized and structured. 
Programmes of study are still shallow in others. Courses in African 
philosophy are yet to be introduced in some and strictly pursued in 
others. 
(ii) Care must be taken by experts in Igbo language to properly 
define certain terms which are still entering contemporary discourse. 
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At times Journalists arbitrarily append one concept or other to 
realities being discussed. Some times these do not stick. Take for 
instance a literal translation of “who is on the line?” as onye no/kwu 
na udo? Placing some emphasis on the use of local dialects and 
languages by students and academics, beyond what is presently 
obtainable, will go a long to enhancing proficiency in translation and 
interpretations. 
(iii) It might be helpful making our conference and seminars 
look more of a workshop, to focus more on technicality. 
(iv) Institutions should encourage professionalism in relevant 
and core areas of the discipline. Promotions and incentives should be 
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